Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine voluntary risk disclosures within annual reports in four key South-East Asian countries' (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia) manufacturing listed companies over the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 2007-2009 financial years.
A focused examination on the manufacturing sector adds important insights. The World Bank notes the aggregate value added to each country's GDP from manufacturing activities is high ( This study is important as it helps us better measure the impact of the GFC and other key factors upon the extent of risk disclosures over this ''crisis'' economic timeframe.
The primary research questions are:
B What is the extent of manufacturing companies' risk disclosures in annual reports over the 2007 B To what extent have such manufacturing companies' risk disclosures changed over time?
B What are the factors explaining the level of risk disclosures?
The current level of risk disclosures released by companies is arguably not sufficient (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004) . Companies are only rarely obliged to issue risk disclosures (i.e. so-called mandatory risk disclosures). This limits the information available to the external users for economic decision making and judgements on social responsibility tenets (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004) . External users need to understand the risks a company takes to create value. They also expect information on the sustainability and social impact of current value-creation strategies. This requires the effective communication about the risks affecting a firm's strategies and managerial action to capitalize on emerging opportunities and to minimize the danger of negative externalities (Beretta and Bozzoland, 2004) .
The concept of asymmetry between management (agents) and investor (principals) is that some information will be given but other relevant data may be withheld. A reduction in information asymmetry will lead to lower monitoring costs between agents and principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Agents are assumed to have incentives to disclose information voluntarily, mainly driven by rational agents' self interest regarding their reputation and remuneration (Healy and Palepu, 2001) . Disclosures can reduce agency costs by minimizing the capacity of managers to adjust disclosure data (Marshall and Weetman, 2002) . In addition, disclosures can reduce estimation risk to better avoid market failure and increase market liquidity leading to more efficient capital markets (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ).
Voluntary disclosure, in the context of globalization of the world's financial markets, has received considerable attention in the accounting literature in recent years Healy and Palepu, 2001; Einhorn, 2007; Wang et al., 2008) . Voluntary disclosure can change the stakeholders' expectation about the value of the firm (Einhorn, 2007) . A firm's decision to communicate more voluntary disclosure might be a response to innovation, globalization or changes in business and capital market environments (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). Spence (1973) and Hill and Short (2009) suggest that risk disclosures will reduce asymmetry information for firms. However as the vast majority of (non-bank) risk disclosures remain purely voluntary in contemporary times, this paper focuses exclusively on a comprehensive list of voluntary risk disclosures.
A better level of risk communication allows stakeholders to be better aware of potential material changes and in doing so, disclosures can reduce agency costs. Arguably, the disclosure of information about risk will improve stakeholder understanding because the company can directly communicate the levels of various risks it faces. This higher level of transparency will greatly ease the task of interpreting the risks of the company by external users (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Marshall and Weetman, 2002; Taylor, 2008 (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Atan and Maruhun, 2009) .
A company must take responsibility for accountability of not only their financial performance but also their social performance (Mirfazli, 2008) ; there are clear risk factors for both aspects of the company's activities. Risk communication can improve stakeholders' understanding of a company's social responsibility profile. This study's selected time span using the 2007-2009 financial years is important due to the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to best understand the extent of risk disclosures communication over an economically challenging economic time frame.
Risk could be defined as the uncertainty associated with both potential gain and loss (Solomon et al., 2000, p. 449) . Linsley and Shrives (2006, p. 389 ) more specifically define risk disclosures as any information disclosing to reader on any opportunities, prospect, hazard, harm, thread or exposure that have already impacted or may give an impact upon the company or management in future. For comparison, finance textbooks typically define ''risk'' as a set of outcomes arising from a decision that can be assigned probabilities whereas ''uncertainty'' arises when probabilities cannot be assigned to the set of outcomes (Linsley and Shrives, 2006, p. 338) . These broad definitions of risk are adopted in this study because they comprehensively embrace ''risks'' and ''uncertainties''. Mirfazli (2008) lists four reasons why companies conduct social disclosure:
1. create a good impression;
2. support the continuity of the company;
3. increase company legitimacy; and 4. minimization of risk.
This study offers important insights on the fourth key reason. The level of risk disclosure practices of four important Southeast Asian countries' manufacturing listed companies is measured using a comprehensive 34-item Risk Disclosure Index (RDI). This list is derived based on an extensive list of business, strategy, operating, market and credit voluntary risk disclosure items from key past studies.
Literature review and hypotheses development Pratten and Mashat (2009, p. 318) comprehensive mail survey of business professionals in Libya notes that ''all of those surveyed agreed that the main purpose for disclosure was the provision of information to financial organisations to assist in the negotiation of financial facilities, with significant other factors including information to tax authorities, to owners on the use of this funds and to investors to assist with their investment decisions''. Arguably, the communication of risk data about the firm is a vital component of such dialogue. This study examines voluntary risk disclosure using four key independent predictor variables:
1. country;
2. company size;
3. managerial ownership; and 4. board independence. Dye (1985) , in his analytical model suggests that voluntary disclosures are affected by disclosure requirements by a country's accounting regime, depending on whether mandatory and voluntary disclosure are complement or substitutes. Meek et al. (1995) find that country/region is one of the factors explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure to assess the comparative importance of national influences vis-à -vis other potential factors by US, UK and continental European multinational corporations. They classify voluntary disclosure into three groups-strategic, non-financial, and financial information. Williams and Tower (1998) examine the preferred level of disclosure in the issue of differential reporting in Singapore and Australia small business entities and note small company managers in that two countries are fundamentally different in their acceptance of international standards requiring more disclosure requirements than existing domestic standards. Tower et al. (1999) study of the extent of International Accounting Standard (IAS) compliance in six countries in the Asia-Pacific region conclude that country of reporting is the main significant factor to the level of compliance. Soewarso et al. (2003) also find that country reporting is the key determinant of Australia and Singapore disclosure practice. Australian companies disclose significantly more information relative to their Singaporean counterparts. Bailey et al. (2006) examine the increased disclosure non-US firms when listing shares in the US and conclude that the county factor is the prime determinant of increased disclosure. They note the greatest increase are for firms from developed countries. Marshall and Weetman (2002) in a two-country comparison between US and UK state that risk disclosure regulations drawn up at the same time and with similar driving forces can have a different impact in two different regulatory environments. Based on the above literature review, this paper adopts country as a determinant factor explaining the association between risk disclosures. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
Country
H1. Risk disclosure levels will vary in the annual reports of listed manufacturing companies across the various countries.
Company size
Many prior studies (e.g. Atan and Maruhun, 2009 ) document the significant effect of company size on disclosure practices. There is a perceived association between company size as a key independent variable with voluntary disclosures of risk information as the dependent variable. Kanto and Schadewitz (1997) find that voluntary disclosure is related to firm-size. Regarding the quantity of risk disclosure, Beretta and Bozzoland (2004) examine annual report of non-financial companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange and note a relationship with size. Similarly, Linsley and Shrives (2009) explore risk disclosures within association between the number of risk disclosures and company size. These studies consistently support the hypothesis that a positive correlation exists between the volume of risk disclosures and company size. Overall, these past studies highlight a positive relationship between company size and the level of disclosure (Atan and Maruhun, 2009; Kanto and Schadewitz, 1997; Beretta and Bozzoland, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2009) . Larger companies are likely to communicate a broader array of social responsibility items. Consistent with agency theory tenets, this paper adopts company size as a potential factor explaining the positive association between risk disclosures by proposing a directional hypothesis:
H2. There is a positive association between company size and the risk disclosures in the annual reports of listed manufacturing companies.
Managerial ownership
Several prior studies document the significant effect of managerial ownership on disclosure practices. Gerb (2000) examines the effect of managerial ownership on firms' disclosures and finds firms with lower levels of managerial ownership are more likely communicators of risk disclosures than firms with higher levels of managerial ownership. Eng and Mak (2003) also note a negative relationship between managerial ownership and increased disclosure. That is, based on agency theory, managers have greater incentives to consume perks and reduced incentives to maximize job performance. Managers with more influence may seek to downplay social responsibility issues. Thus, lower managerial ownership is associated with increased voluntary disclosure. Consistent with the results of most past studies which note a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the level of disclosure (Gerb, 2000; Eng and Mak, 2003) , this paper analyses ownership structure as a potential factor explaining the negative association between aggregate risk disclosures by proposing a directional hypothesis:
H3. There is a negative association between managerial ownership and the risk disclosures in the annual reports of listed manufacturing companies.
Board independence
Prior studies document a significant effect of board independence on disclosure practices. For instance, Baek et al. (2009) conclude that firms with a higher percentage of outside directors are more likely to disclose board and management process information. Moreover, Chen and Jaggi (2000) note a positive association between the proportion of independent non-executive directors (INDs) on corporate boards of Hong Kong firms and comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. Most studies thus find that INDs on corporate boards have a positive influence on management decision to disclose more voluntary information. Garcia-Meca and Sanches-Ballesta (2010) broadly examine the overall literature via a sample of 27 empirical studies examining differences of corporate governance systems with meta-analysis. They conclude there is a clear positive association of board independence with voluntary disclosure especially in the countries with higher investor protection rights. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) state that boards with a larger proportion of independent, non-executive directors (proxy for board-monitoring effectiveness) are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. A vibrant, more independent board structure can potential increase the dissemination of information relating to risks associated with social responsibility and economic company issues. Beretta and Bozzoland (2004) examine annual report of non-financial companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange, and highlight that different types of board director fulfil different functions, with both the number of executive and the number of independent directors positively related to the level of corporate risk reporting. In summary, the results of most past studies note a positive relationship between board independence and the level of disclosure (Baek et al., 2009; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Beretta and Bozzoland, 2004; Garcia-Meca and Sanches-Ballesta, 2010) . Accordingly, this paper adopts the level of board independence as a potential factor explaining the positive association between risk disclosures by proposing a directional hypothesis:
H4. There is a positive association between higher levels of board independence and the risk disclosures in the annual reports of listed manufacturing companies.
This study also examines age of business, leverage, and profitability as control variables to be included in the statistical analysis. Those control variables are consistently utilized in prior research to add further insights regarding voluntary disclosure (Solomon et al., 2000; Atan and Maruhun, 2009; Homö lle, 2009; Marshall and Weetman, 2002; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Morrison, 1993; Desgagne and Gozlan, 2003; Ahmed et al., 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 1983; Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Thornton, 2004; Makhija and Patton, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2009; Bremer and Pettway, 2002; Lee et al., 2003; Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; Xifra and Ordeix, 2009 ). Gray et al. (1995) . The key elements from these above authors are utilized in this study to derive the benchmark disclosure checklist.
Research methodology
Using the past literature approach, an equal weighting/unweighted index approach is adopted in scoring the RDI. The index assumes that each item of disclosure is equally important . Overall, this simple measurement approach is considered most appropriate as it is less subjective and less judgmental . After finalising the risk disclosure index, a scoring sheet is developed to assess the extent of voluntary risk disclosure. Consistent with past studies, each item[3] is given a score of one if disclosed and zero if it is not, subject to the applicability of the item concerning the firm.
The predictor variables are measured as follows: country is categorized via a dummy variable, company size is calculated as total assets at the end of the financial year in US$ and logged to reduce skewness, managerial ownership is measured by percentage of managerial ownership, board independence is computed as the percentage of independent directors and for control variables: leverage is derived as total liabilities divided by total assets, profitability is measured by net profit divided by total assets, and age of business is calculated as the number of years from inception. Table I ). [4] are no greater than 0.5, this lessens concern about multicollinearity of predictor variables in the regression analysis (Cooke, 1989) . Analysis shows that four companies are potential outliers (for each of their three years), and are thus dropped from the 180 annual reports sample resulting in a final [5] 168 firm years' sample.
Results and discussions
This study examines the relationship between the independent variables (country, company size, managerial ownership, board independence), control variables (profitability, leverage, age of business), and the dependent variable (Risk Disclosure Index). B All regressions reveal that the country variable is statistically significant. Thus, there is overwhelming evidence to conclude that country is associated with the extent of risk disclosure. H1 is accepted. Indonesian firms' risk disclosures are fundamentally lower than the other countries (see Table II -footnote a).
B Size is uniformly statistically significant with positive coefficients. Providing support for agency theory tenets, H2 is accepted. B There is consistently no evidence to accept the H3 hypothesis that managerial ownership is related to risk disclosures. Table I shows that managerial ownership is falling every year, therefore managers may be asserting less influence over time.
B Board independence is positively significant in three of the four regressions, leading to acceptance of H4 (consistent with agency theory tenets).
B The leverage control variable is significant in most regression runs. Yet, the actual sign is negative which is opposite of the predicted sign (þ). Companies, which have more leverage disclose less risk disclosure, not more. These Table II regression results generally support agency theory tenets. The predictor variables are consistent with the previous studies: company size (Atan and Maruhun, 2009; Kanto and Schadewitz, 1997; Beretta and Bozzoland, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2009 ) and board independence (Baek et al., 2009; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Beretta and Bozzoland, 2004; Garcia-Meca and Sanches-Ballesta, 2010) . The level of risk disclosure, an important aspect of CSR communication, can be explained by key company characteristics.
Our findings show that the communication of risk data stays relatively consistent across the three GFC ''crisis'' years (26-29 per cent) (see Table I ). This is arguably a low level from a social responsibility corporate lens during an extraordinarily difficult economic period.
Multiple regression analysis provides evidence that country, size and board independence are positively and leverage is negatively significantly associated with the extent of voluntary risk disclosure.
These results also provide support that country is a predictor for the extent of risk disclosure in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. Least developed Indonesia consistently has statistically lower levels of risk disclosure (Table II -footnote a) . This country finding is interesting in that as Indonesia is the least developed country in the sample it is likely to have the highest business risk scenario and the greatest need for clear communication of risk. Yet their companies only voluntarily communicate 21.64 per cent of key risk items. This result is consistent with Bailey et al. (2006) suggestion that the greatest increase in disclosure are firms from developed countries. This implies that for the developing countries the impact of risk factors upon social responsibility themes is not well communicated. The result is also consistent with Marshall and Weetman (2002) statement that risk disclosure rules drawn up at the same time and with similar driving forces can have a different impact in the different regimes. 
Conclusions, implications and recommendations
Social accountancy aims to measure the social benefits and expenses of activities (Mirfazli, 2008) . Communication of risk factors are one important element in a broad range of company social responsibilities. The disclosure of these risk activities provides essential data to assess accountability and sustainability. This paper focuses on an empirical analysis of the veracity of agency theory to predict the level of manufacturing firms' risk disclosures. A comprehensive risk disclosure index (RDI) checklist is created with key predictor variables tested to explain the extent of such communication over time. Three years sample data totalling 180 listed manufacturing companies' firm year reports in four important Southeast Asian countries (Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore) are examined.
The regression analysis shows that the country, size and board independence variables statistically help explain the extent of risk disclosures. The first finding is that different countries communicate differently. One plausible explanation is the different response based on varying levels of economic development is related to the acceptance of risk information by shareholders in each country (Marshall and Weetman, 2002) . A second key finding is that bigger firms disclose more risk disclosure data. These firms are assumed to have stronger financial resources to cover the cost of disclosure information voluntarily. External communication can reduce monitoring costs as part of agency costs by minimizing the capacity of managers to adjust disclosure data (Marshall and Weetman, 2002) . Therefore, big manufacturing firms that have more complex operation will better ensure monitoring activity to reduce asymmetry information. Third, firms with better corporate governance systems communicate more risk information. The findings show that greater presence of independent directors within the company positively affects the risk disclosure levels (Beretta and Bozzoland, 2004) . Arguably, independent directors have less personal interests, which allow them to better inform stakeholders about risk information. In addition, independent directors have incentives to exercise their decision control to maintain reputational capital. The main purpose of the board is to provide governance protection. Stakeholders, affected by risk, needs representation on the board that is independent of management to protect their assets (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Chen, 2006) . Finally, managerial ownership does not influence the level of risk disclosure. Managers in these firms lowered their ownership steadily over the the GFC study period and thus may be a lesser influence (Tables I and II) . Overall, the evidence shows a low level of risk disclosure by companies over the entire GFC period. Such low communication of comprehensive risk elements leads to more uncertainty as to organisational efforts towards social responsibility and long-term sustainability development.
Mirfazli (2008) offers a ''qualitative'' categorisation of the extent of disclosure that could be provided by companies to their stakeholders. The three communication categories are ''adequate'', ''fair'' and ''full''. Adequate disclosures cover the bare minimum, fair disclosure includes ethical targets whereas full disclosure represents communication of all relevant information (including a wide swath of social responsibility issues). The idealised dissemination of risk information well fits into this comprehensive third category. However, the evidence from this study notes a level of disclosure that could only be categorised as ''adequate'' at best. Greater risk communication is thus advocated to increase stakeholder understanding of all aspects of company's activities: economic, social and environmental.
Overall, this study finds that there are varying levels of risk disclosure over time, across countries and these are influenced by key firm characteristics and economic drivers. The main findings from this study are useful for self-evaluation and benchmarking of risk communication by other corporations across the global landscape. Financial report preparers should consider matching their risk communication practices with the leaders in their industries. They are potentially at a disadvantage if they do not better communicate their risk status to their stakeholders from the perspective of social reporting and economic evaluation.
For stakeholders, the inclusion of extensive risk disclosures in the annual reports is useful for decision making. Stakeholders may reward companies that include greater communication of potential firm risks. Higher risk disclosure can lead to a better understanding of a company's social responsibility stance.
A limitation of this study is that the sample is based on manufacturing companies in key South-East Asian countries. However, for the purposes of generalization, the findings should be tested in other countries across industry sectors. Future research is recommended to expand the number and types of countries studied and expand the longitudinal analysis as countries recover from the Global Financial Crisis. Lastly, qualitative research techniques could be employed to further examine how risk disclosure enhance our understanding of social reporting.
Notes
1. IAS 1 requires companies to disclose: financial risk management objectives and policies; management's judgments in determining when substantially all the significant risks and rewards of ownership of financial assets and lease assets are transferred to other entities; also firm required to disclose information about the key assumptions concerning the future, and other key sources of estimation uncertainty at the end of the reporting period, that have a significant risk of causing a material adjustment to the carrying amounts of assets and liabilities within the next financial year (IASB, 2008) .
2. The manufacturing industries in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) are: food, beverage and tobacco products, textile mills, textile product mills, apparel, leather and allied products, wood products, paper, printing and related support activities, petroleum and coal products, chemical, plastics and rubber products, non-metallic mineral products, primary metal, fabricated metal products, machinery, computer and electronic products, electrical equipment, appliance and components, transportation equipment, furniture and related products, and finally miscellaneous manufacturing.
3. The preliminary disclosures checklist is first subject to a thorough screening in order to ensure individual items are not mandatory. This screening of the voluntary risk disclosure checklist is done with reference to International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) mandatory risk disclosures, the mandatory risk disclosure country's rules in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, and includes a pilot study concerning the possible applicability of mandatory items in IFRS 7, IFRS 9, and IAS 32. The pilot study is conducted on 60 annual reports (five in each country for [2007] [2008] [2009] ). This pilot study purpose is to ascertain if there are mandatory disclosures impacts by IFRS 7 in RDI in four countries. The pilot study findings are that eight items from the original 42 item variant of the Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) are mandatory (based on IFRS 7) and are thus removed from the initial Risk Disclosure Index (RDI). This screening leads to the selection of the final Risk Disclosure Index (RDI) consisting of 34 items.
4. The highest correlation is 0.494.
5. Multiple regression analyses can be severely and adversely affected by failures of the data to remain constant with the assumptions that customarily accompany regression models. Mahalanobis distance and Cook's distance as diagnostic methods are available to help identify outlier data. Diagnostics are thus valuable adjuncts to regression analyses. Mahalanobis distance and Cook's distance are capable of producing partial plots in the SPSS program. This allows for the saving of residuals (Velleman and Welsch, 1981) . From the residual values, Mahalanobis value should be , 24.32 (based on seven predictor variables), and Cook's value should be , 1 (Coakes and Steed, 2007) .
